This paper studies the optimal income redistribution and optimal monitoring when disability bene…ts are intended for disabled people but some of the disabled do not claim disability bene…ts and enter the labor force. Classi…cation errors also occur. Some able applicants with high distaste for work are falsely granted disability bene…ts (type II errors) and some disabled applicants are denied disability bene…ts (type I errors). The accuracy of monitoring depends on the resources devoted to it. Labor supply responses are at the extensive margin. The paper derives the optimal income tax-transfer schedule that incorporates welfare and disability bene…ts and takes into account monitoring costs. The cost of monitoring and the co-existence of welfare and disability bene…ts play in favor of Earned Income Tax Credits for disabled workers who forgo disability bene…ts as well as for disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance.
Introduction
This paper examines the optimal redistributive structure and the optimal accuracy of monitoring when disability bene…ts are intended for disabled people but where some able agents who have a high distaste for work mimic them.
1 This paper integrates classi…cation errors of type II (i.e. able people who falsely claim to be disabled and receive disability bene…ts) with classi…cation errors of type I (i.e. applicants who are truly disabled but fail to qualify hence are rejected from disability assistance). According to empirical evidence, both type I and type II error rates in the U.S. disability programs are substantial. While there is some disagreement in the literature regarding the magnitude of the type I error rate (with estimates ranging from about 20% to almost 60%), most studies tend to consider that the type II error rate is about 20% (see, e.g., Nagi, 1969; Smith and Lilienfeld, 1971; Benitez-Silva et al., 2011) .
A large empirical literature has analyzed incomplete take-up among intended recipients in various programs and has emphasized a huge variation in participation across di¤erent programs (see, e.g., Mo¢ tt, 2003 , Currie, 2006 . In EU countries, about 30% of people who report severe disability do not get disability bene…ts and work (Eurostat, 2001) . Some disability bene…ts programs contain perverse incentives that exclude disabled persons with partial work capacity from the labor market, as carefully detailled in OECD (2009). To be consistent with these pieces of evidence, we endogenize take-up 2 so that people with relatively low degrees of disability are deterred from disability assistance and enter the labor force while those with relatively higher degrees of disability claim disability bene…ts. Here non-take-up is de…ned as disabled people who do not apply for disability bene…ts and enter the labor force which contrasts with more standard models of take-up.
In the latter, their labor supply decision is identical whether they claim or not bene…ts (see e.g., Mo¢ tt, 1983) .
3
In our model, disability bene…ts co-exist with welfare bene…ts, the former are targeted bene…ts (Akerlof, 1978) conditional on disability status while the latter are solely dependent on reported income and delivered through the income tax schedule, as standard in the tax literature (see e.g., Mirrlees 1971 , Stiglitz 1987 , Boadway, Marceau and Sato 1999 . People who do not work and who do not receive disability bene…ts receive welfare bene…ts. 4 The model assumes that individuals are distributed over two private characteristics: their individual productivity on the one hand, and their disutility when working on the other hand. The distributions of both characteristics are common knowledge. Individual productivity is distributed over two values (high and low), whereas the disutility when working is continuous. Moreover, individuals are either disabled or able, and their disability status is perfectly correlated with their productivity. Thus, a disabled (able) individual will always have a low (high) productivity.
inactivity. Therefore, introducing endogenous monitoring into the tax model reduces the participation tax (de…ned as the tax the worker pays plus the welfare bene…t) on disabled and able workers.
It also reduces the sum of the tax in low-skilled jobs with the disability bene…t.
Second, it highlights when it becomes optimal to provide these disabled with substantial …nan-cial incentives to work. By de…nition, an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides the largest transfer to disabled or low-productivity workers. This contrasts with a Negative Income Tax (NIT), whereby non-employed agents receive the largest transfer. As usual in the literature, let us de…ne the ratio of social marginal utility to the marginal value of public funds as the marginal social welfare weight. Neglecting monitoring and disability bene…ts, the literature has well established that when labor supply responses are modeled along the extensive margin, a marginal social welfare weight lower (larger) than one on disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance implies an NIT (EITC) (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002) . Contrastingly, this paper shows that, with a costly monitoring technology, a marginal social welfare weight lower than one on disabled workers (who forgo welfare assistance) does not preclude an EITC. An EITC provides work incentives that, by reducing the number of applicants for bene…ts, reduce monitoring costs. Consequently, an EITC is optimal for a greater array of model parameters than in a pure tax-transfer model. This paper also shows that a marginal social welfare weight on recipients of disability bene…ts lower than one implies an EITC for disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance but also for disabled workers who forgo disability assistance.
Third, relaxing the standard assumption that monitoring, and therefore the probability of errors, is taken as given, this paper highlights that the optimal level of type II errors trades o¤ more tax revenue by reducing the number of cheaters and the cost of monitoring. Moreover, the optimal level of type I errors trades o¤ more tax revenue by increasing the number of type I errors (because monitoring cost is reduced and because some disabled people enter the labor force) and the welfare loss from disabled people who are falsely rejected from disability assistance. As one would expect, when the marginal cost of monitoring is very high, no monitoring is optimal.
These three results are valid under paternalistic preferences and also under a utilitarian criterion, as con…rmed in Appendix G.
In the full information economy, under paternalistic utilitarian preferences, there are no type I and type II errors and all able people work whatever their disutility of work, in the full information economy. In asymmetric information, the paper highlights that a costless monitoring technology that would perfectly screen between disabled and able applicants and would enforce all able to work is not optimal. To reach the ideal full information allocation, the tax authority needs to not only observe the correct health status of claimants by its monitoring, but must also observe their precise disutility if they worked.
We proceed in the following section by setting up the basic model. Assuming the paternalistic criterion, Sections 3 and 4 derive the optimal tax-transfer and monitoring programs under full information and asymmetric information, respectively. The appendix provides the optimal tax schedules under utilitarian preferences. in the population whose productivity is w H . There is a perfect correlation between disability and lower productivity. This assumption is in the vein of the statutory de…nition of disabled people who are eligible for disability bene…ts. The applicant is considered to be disabled not just because of the existence of a medical impairment, but because the impairment drastically reduces his or her productivity and precludes any substantial and gainful work (Hu et al., 2001) . A disabled worker in a wheelchair who has the functional capability to engage in a substantial gainful job is not considered disabled either by the U.S. Social Security Act or in this model. It is assumed that w H -workers may work in either low skilled or high skilled jobs, but w L -workers may work only in low skilled jobs.
Assume that agents decide whether or not to work. This assumption seems natural since the empirical literature has shown that the extensive margin of labor responses is important, especially at the low income end (e.g., Meghir and Phillips, 2011) while most estimates of hours of work elasticities conditional on working are small (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999) . Utility is quasilinear and represented by: Harkness (1993) , Cu¤ (2000) and Marchand et al. (2003) , we assume that d measures disutility when working as a result of the degree of disability, i.e., the intensity of the physical or mental pain associated with work when disabled. By contrast, a is disutility when working as a result of distaste for work or work aversion. Following Arneson (1990) and Roemer (1998) , people are held responsible for their taste for work a while d stems from luck; hence, those people are not responsible for it. Therefore, able (disabled) people are unambiguously noneligible (eligible) for disability bene…ts. 9 This creates a 8 We want to see whether an EITC or an NIT is optimal. This requires us to describe only the participation tax rates. Therefore, it is appropriate to assume a discrete support for skills, like in Saez (2002) . For simplicity, we assume two productivity levels, but increasing the number of productivities would not modify our main results. 9 It is possible to follow the suggestion by Pestieau and Racionero (2009) to disentangle the disabled's parameter clear boundary between eligible (disabled) and noneligible (able) applicants for disability bene…ts.
This boundary is helpful to clearly highlight the e¤ects of errors in distributing disability bene…ts.
Disability bene…ts are aimed at disabled people who do not work. By contrast, the nonemployed who do not receive disability bene…ts receive welfare bene…ts that are provided without any condition on their disability status (hence, without monitoring). Welfare bene…ts are the usual transfers for people at the bottom of the earnings distribution in the tax model without tagging.
The model allows that some individuals do not apply for bene…ts they are eligible for (and enter the labor force). Stigma is a possible explanation for incomplete take-up. Incorporating take-up costs does not modify our main qualitative results and simply adds a new term in some of the optimal tax formulae. 10 Here, we neglect take-up costs to avoid additional complexity in our already quite general model that does not substantially modify the analytical results.
Monitoring technology
A feature of disability systems is that the eligibility of applicants is assessed on the basis of the disability status rather than being solely dependent on reported incomes. The process of determining individual eligibility has been called "tagging"by Akerlof (1978) . When an individual applies for disability bene…ts, she is monitored by the disability agency. The monitoring technology is only informative about the disability classi…cation (neither about precise health status d , nor about attitudes to work a ).
In Akerlof (1978) , tagging allows perfect identi…cation of a given subset of disabled people. In this paper, it is assumed that the accuracy of tagging is limited by classi…cation errors of type I (rejection errors) and by classi…cation errors of type II (award errors).
Di¤ering from the existing literature (Stern, 1982; Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995; Parsons, 1996) , the monitoring (tagging) technology is not exogenous in this model. The accuracy of monitoring depends on the per capita resources, M , devoted to it. The higher is M , the lower is the probability of type II error q ("false positive"), i.e., the higher the precision with which an able agent claiming disability bene…ts is detected. Similarly, the higher is M , the lower is the probability of type I error p ("false negative"), i.e., the higher the precision with which a disabled agent claiming disability bene…ts is rejected. Formally, the per capita cost of monitoring, M (p; q), depends on the precision of the monitoring technology with @M=@p < 0, @M=@q < 0, @ 1 0 This is shown in the working paper Jacquet (2010) . In the latter paper, the utility when not working is v(x) where denotes the (endogenous) reputational stigma à la Besley and Coate (1992) or the take-up cost of snowball (i.e., the take-up by undeserving implies a snowball e¤ect on the take-up by the deserving).
1 1 We also assume that lim (p;q)!(1;0) M (p; q) = 0. Having p = 1 and q = 0 corresponds to the situation where none of the applicants receive disability bene…ts. Therefore, nobody will actually claim disability bene…ts and the disability bene…t will not be observed. Monitoring is then assumed costless. The model boils down to a standard nonlinear income tax system (without tagging) so that welfare bene…ts are provided to all non-employed people. Similarly, we also assume that lim (p;q)!(0;1) M (p; q) = 0. Intuitively, providing bene…ts to all applicants implies that the level of type II error is maximal (q = 1) but there is no type I error (p = 0). Since this does not require any screening, the cost per applicant can be assumed to be nil, i.e. M (0; 1) = 0. Finally, lim (p;q)!(0;0) M (p; q) = +1.
indicate a type I error rate of 22.5% and a type II error rate, quite close, of 21.2%. Nagi (1969) submitted a sample of 2454 disability insurance cases (1434 of which had been initially allowed and 1020 initially denied by the SSA) to a group of independent clinical experts. The latter found a type I error rate of 48% and a (much lower) type II error rate of 19%. A reexamination of the cases by the SSA in the light of the additional information provided by the external audit led to 20.8% of the denials being changed to allowances (type I errors) and 8.2% of the initial allowances being changed to denials (type II errors). A more recent study by Benitez-Silva et al. (2011) 
Full information
Under full information (so-called …rst-best), the disability agencies have no role to play, there is no monitoring, no type I and type II errors. The government implements a tax policy depending on and w Y (Y = L; H), hence it also assigns individuals to low-skilled jobs (where the gross wage is w L ), to high-skilled jobs (where the gross wage is w H ) or to inactivity (activity u). Activity assignment is captured through the functions`L ( d ) :
w L -agents with this value for d are employed (inactive) and`H ( a ) :
(`H ( a ) = 0) if w H -agents with this value for a are employed (inactive). w L -agents cannot get access to high-skilled jobs and, since e¢ ciency matters, it will never be optimal that w H -agents work in low-skilled jobs. By putting these people in high-skilled jobs instead of low-skilled jobs, they produce more and that increase can be used to raise consumption bundles. Hence, formally, the government determines four consumption functions:
for the w L -inactive agents, and x u H ( a ) for the w H -inactive. All of these functions go from R + to R + .
We de…ne the government's budget constraint as
where R(? 0) is the exogenous revenue available to the economy.
Appendix G presents results under utilitarian preferences. In the core of this paper, however, our social objective function uses a paternalistic view for the valuation of distaste for work. The government has a reference distaste for work equal to zero, i.e., it attaches a weight of zero to the distaste for work a . The paternalistic utilitarian objective states
This normative criterion is a sum (weighted by the share in the population) of utility functions corrected for the features that individuals are responsible for. Implicit in this approach is the idea that income should not be transferred as compensation for distaste for work ( a ) because individuals are responsible for their own taste for work, and disabled workers contrary to the lazy ones ought to be compensated for their handicap. Schokkaert et al. (2004) and Cremer et al. For comparison, Appendix G shows that our main analytical results are still valid under utilitarian preferences.
Under the paternalistic utilitarian objective function (1), all that matters is the sum of utilities except that the levels of disutility of work a are not taken into account. This section presents the optimum when full information prevails. The optimum is characterized as follows.
Proposition 1 In full information, everyone gets the same consumption (x) under paternalistic utilitarian preferences, and a Negative Income Tax (NIT) is optimal. All able people work while
A proof is given in Appendix A and the intuition is as follows. In full information, consumption levels are the same for all individuals (x) since the …rst-order conditions require identical marginal utility of consumption for all individuals with additively separable utility functions. The tax system then redistributes from able individuals toward disabled ones because the former have a larger productivity. Suppose all able individuals are working. The social bene…t of having the able individuals with the highest a stop working is zero. The cost of having an able individual who stops working is w H (> 0). Therefore, it is optimal that all able agents work. All able individuals are then treated the same by the tax system, whatever their individual level of a . Compared to the outcome we would get under utilitarian preferences, the level of redistribution from the able group towards the disabled group is reinforced due to the non-inclusion of a in the paternalistic objective function. Under utilitarianism, not all able people work (see Appendix G) while, under the paternalistic criterion, all able people do work.
The same exercise can be done for disabled people. Suppose all disabled individuals are working.
The social bene…t of having a disabled agent endowed with d to stop working is d 2 [0; 1) and the social cost is w L (> 0), which is constant. Therefore, there is a threshold value d such that those with d > d do not work and those with d d do work. d is such that the net loss of utility when the marginal disabled individuals are shifted from the disability assistance to the lowskilled job is equal to the gain of resources (w L ) valued according to their common marginal utility, i.e., d = v 0 (x)w L with x denoting the consumption level. There is then also some redistribution going on within the group of disabled people. Since the levels of disutility due to disability d are included into the objective function, all disabled people are not treated the same by the tax system. Redistribution takes place from the disabled workers toward the disabled inactive. Finally, since the consumption level is the same for everyone, the transfer (or tax) toward the disabled workers, x w L , is lower than the transfer toward the inactive disabled, x. This is the de…nition of a Negative Income Tax (NIT), which is then optimal.
The full information optimum may assist in grasping the redistributive motives of our model.
First, redistribution takes place from the able people toward the disabled because of the skill heterogeneity. Second, because a is not encapsulated in the paternalistic utilitarian preferences, all able agents (whatever their level of a ) do work, under full information. Third, redistribution takes place within the disabled because of the heterogeneity in their d levels.
Asymmetric Information
Under asymmetric information, the tax authority is only able to observe income levels and thus can condition taxation only on income. In this context, the government provides a welfare bene…t to individuals who do not work.
When monitoring is introduced, disability agencies have access to more information than the tax authority. When an individual applies for disability bene…ts, the disability agency can test the claimant and obtains more information on her ability versus disability status. However, disability agencies do not observe either d or a . A non-employed applicant who is screened by the disability agency as disabled receives a disability bene…t x D . The other non-employed receive welfare bene…ts
The government decides over four consumption bundles: x D for bene…ciaries of disability bene…ts, x W for welfare bene…ciaries, x L for workers in low-skilled jobs, x H for workers in high-skilled jobs and the optimal levels of type I errors (p) and of type II errors (q).
Able workers can work either in a low or high-skilled job depending on maxfv (x L ) a ; v (x H ) a g. However, since our objective functions are increasing in individuals' consumption, it will never be optimal that able people work in low-skilled jobs. A formal proof is given in Appendix B. By putting able workers in high-skilled jobs instead, they produce more that can be used to increase everyone's consumption in a way that respects the set of incentive compatibility constraints and hence increases social objective value. Consequently, to induce high-skilled people to work in high-skilled jobs,
since the individual aversion to work a is the same in both jobs. Equation (2) implies that only disabled people work in low-skilled jobs at the optimum. Therefore, these workers are perfectly tagged as disabled.
Individual decisions and threshold values
An individual decides to apply or not for disability bene…ts. If they apply, there is some probability they get a disability bene…t (they are deemed ineligible for the disability bene…t), this probability is q (1 q) for able individuals and 1 p (p) for disabled applicants. When the applicant is rejected, she faces two choices, go to work and get v(x X ) y (with (X; y) = (L; d) for disabled agents or (X; y) = (H; a) for able agents) or go on welfare (and do not work) and get the welfare bene…t We now analyze the decisions of disabled agents formally and graphically. Each disabled individual chooses, depending on her level of d , according to
For each value of d , the utility of the disabled individual when she chooses to work, 
The hyphenated curve represents the utility of applicants. It is decreasing when
. Disability bene…ts are then at least as large as welfare bene…ts,
otherwise, the hyphenated curve in Figure 1 would always be below the plane curve v(x L ) d or the dotted curve v(x W ) so that no agent would ever apply for disability bene…ts.
Moreover, we easily see from Figure 1 that the threshold value b d characterizes disabled agents who, when rejected from disability assistance (with a probability p), are indi¤erent between working in low-skilled jobs and being on welfare assistance, i.e.
which can be rewritten as equation (3). Disabled agents with disutilities of labor above this threshold value will go on welfare when rejected from disability assistance since
Similarly, we can de…ne the threshold value e d characterizing disabled agents who are indi¤erent between v(x L ) d in a low-skilled job on the one hand, and v(x D ) on disability assistance or v(x L ) (with probabilities 1 p and p, respectively) on the other hand, i.e.
The choice of disabled agents to claim or not disability bene…ts does not depend on the probability p. For agents whose d 2 e d ; 1 ¸the worst utility outcome when taking the lottery (i.e., when applying for bene…ts) is identical to the utility reached when not taking the lottery, v (x L ) d . Therefore, p does not drive the decision to apply or not for bene…ts.
14 TO INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 1 3 Recall that we assume d 2 [0; +1), however, more generally, this intersection could take place for a negative value of d . In this case, we would have a corner solution where all disabled people apply for disability bene…ts.
1 4 In this model, the decision to work or to apply for disability is independent of p and tagging forces disabled with d > e d to work with probability p. We might alternatively think that disabled people are more likely to apply for disability bene…ts the greater the chance of getting them, i.e. p being lower. One way to model this could be to A …gure very similar to Figure 1 and a similar analysis to the one above could be drawn to highlight the choices of the able people. It would consist in substituting p, x L , e d , b d with 1 q, x H , e a , b a , respectively. It is skipped here and we directly provide the threshold values.
The threshold e a characterizes able individuals indi¤erent between working in high-skilled job on the one hand, and v(x D ) on disability assistance or v(x H ) a (with probabilities q and 1 q, respectively) on the other hand:
Similarly, another threshold value b a characterizes able agents who apply for disability bene…ts and are indi¤erent between going back to work and being on welfare, i.e.:
Since disability bene…ts are greater than welfare bene…ts (4), we have e a b a from (6) and (7) and e d b d from (3) and (5). Since consumption in high-skilled jobs is larger than in lowskilled jobs (see (2)), we also obtain e a e d and b a b d . Moreover, from (5)- (7), we obtain Figure 2 summarizes choices of individuals, densities and threshold levels.
TO INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Lemma 1 points out that in both ability groups, there are people who work and people who do not work.
Lemma 1 Active and inactive people in both ability groups coexist under asymmetric information (i.e., 1 > e d > 0 and 1 > e a > 0).
Appendix C provides the proof.
Ranking of consumption levels and distribution of individuals in the population
From (5) and e d > 0, we have
Combined with (2) and (4), the ranking of consumption levels can be summarized as
introduce a cost of applying for disability bene…ts, k < 1 as follows:
so that a higher p increases the number of disabled choosing to work. This would add behavioral responses to the necessary condition (33) that we neglect here.
The government budget constraint can be written as
W is the share of the population that is disabled and being (falsely) rejected from disability assistance end up on welfare, a W is the share of the population that is able and being (correctly) rejected from disability assistance go on welfare, d L is the share of population that is disabled and works, d D is the share of population that is disabled and receives disability bene…ts, a D is the share of population that is able but unjusti…ably collects disability bene…ts, a H is the proportion of the population that is able and works (it includes the refused undeserving claimants who work). Table 1 displays the proportion of individuals in each position. The per capita cost of monitoring M (p; q) appears ex ante and for any individual who has applied for disability assistance, i.e., for 
Elasticity concepts and social marginal welfare weights
To simplify the optimal tax formulae, we can introduce more de…nitions.
, be the tax paid by people on welfare assistance and T D x D is the disability bene…t. Let us de…ne the elasticity of participation of the disabled workers with respect to x L and the elasticity of the able workers with respect to x H , respectively, as (5) and (3) and where (6) and (7). These elasticities measure the percentages of disabled (able) workers in low-skilled (high-skilled) jobs who decide to leave the labor force when x L (x H ) decreases by 1 percent. The empirical literature on the participation decisions (e.g.,
Immervoll et alii (2007) and Meghir and Phillips (2011) ) typically estimates the elasticities of participation with respect to the di¤erence between income in employment and in unemployment.
For given welfare and disability bene…ts, L and H equal these estimated elasticities.
We de…ne the elasticity of the recipients of disability bene…ts with respect to the bene…t x D as
where 6) . This elasticity measures the percentage of disabled and able people on disability assistance who leave disability assistance when x D is reduced by 1 percent. Empirical studies such as Parsons (1980), Bound and Waidmann (1992) and Gruber (2000) provide elasticities of labor force nonparticipation with respect to disability bene…ts. The latter elasticity is however slightly distinct from D since it is de…ned using the percentage of recipients of disability bene…ts entering the labor force instead of the percentage of workers entering disability assistance.
We also de…ne three quasi-elasticities. First, the quasi-elasticity of participation without prior application of the disabled workers as
where
This quasi-elasticity measures the percentage of disabled people who directly take low-skilled jobs without applying for disability bene…ts when x L increases by 1 percent. Similarly, the quasi-elasticity of participation without prior application of the able workers is de…ned as
where @ a D =@x H = N a qg e a v 0 (x H ) which is also equal to @ a H =@ e a @ e a =@x H . This quasielasticity measures the percentage of able workers who directly take high-skilled jobs without applying for disability bene…ts when x H increases by 1 percent. Third, the quasi-elasticity of being on disability assistance of the able people with respect to x D is de…ned as
. This quasi-elasticity measures the percentage of recipients of disability bene…ts who leave disability assistance for high-skilled jobs when x D decreases by 1 percent.
Next, we de…ne the marginal social welfare weights for working agents whose consumption is x L and x H , respectively, and for recipients of disability bene…ts x D as the ratio of the social marginal utility of consumption and the shadow price of the public funds:
The optimal tax schedule
The paternalistic utilitarian preferences e P can be written as
The Lagrangian states as
where e a , b a , e d , b d are given by (6)-(3).
Next, observe that the average of the inverse of the private marginal utility of consumption is given by
Let subscripts to the function e P denote the partial derivative of e P with respect to the argument in the subscript and note that the e¤ect of a uniform increase in private utilities on e P is given by
The following theorem states the solution for the second-best problem.
Proposition 2 Under asymmetric information, the optimal levels of consumption, type I and type II errors satisfy the budget constraint (9) and the following six equations:
and
(1 q) @ e $ @q = 0 and @ e $ @q 0
We interpret each equation in turn. This allows us to highlight the key economic e¤ects underlying the optimal tax pro…le. In particular, it emphasizes the new e¤ects that appear in comparison with the standard tax model without disability assistance and monitoring.
First-order condition with respect to x L , (22)
To interpret Equation (22), consider a small increase in consumption x L (i.e., a small reduction of the income tax in low-skilled jobs), around the optimal tax schedule. This creates a mechanical e¤ect and behavioral (labor supply response) e¤ects. The mechanical e¤ect is 
pivotal) disability bene…ts' recipients to directly enter the labor force (without even applying for disability assistance) and
disabled workers, who previously chose to work when rejected from disability assistance, to work directly (without even applying for disability bene…ts). Each of the latter induces a gain of M (p; q) in government revenue. Each of the former induces a gain in government revenue equal to w L
. That is the tax paid by each disabled worker (T L ) and the savings from the bene…ts no longer paid to her as disabled recipient ( T D ), as well as the associated cost of monitoring (M (p; q)). The third behavioral response comes from
(pivotal) welfare recipients rejected from disability assistance who now work rather than going on welfare. The gain in tax revenue for each of them is equal to
That is the tax paid by each disabled worker (T L ) and the saving from the welfare bene…t no longer paid to her ( T W ). At the optimum, the sum of all these mechanical and behavioral e¤ects equals zero and gives
From the Lagrangian (19), it is straightforward to check that this expression is the …rst-order condition with respect to x L . Adding (subtracting)
the last (second) term of the L.H.S. of (28) and using the elasticity (10) as well as (13) allows to rewrite the previous equation as (22). (22) is the classic equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ in the model without neither monitoring nor disability assistance. Assuming there is no disability assistance, no monitoring hence substituting M (p; q) = 0, p = 0 and T W = T D in (22) yields the standard optimal tax schedule with extensive responses (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002) , i.e.
The participation tax on disabled workers, T L T W , is inversely related to the participation elasticity L in the vein of the inverse elasticity rule of Ramsey. Similarly, the …nancial incentive to enter the labor force increases (hence the participation tax, T L T W , decreases) with the marginal social welfare weight of (disabled) workers (g L ).
The other terms, (29) and (22), we see that the model with tagging is identical to the simple tax model with weight
Therefore, adding disability assistance and costly monitoring amounts to attributing a higher welfare weight to workers in low-skilled jobs when there are more disabled people prone to work without applying for disability bene…ts, when monitoring is more costly or when the di¤erence between disability bene…t and welfare bene…t is higher. Let us have a deeper look at each term.
A larger quasi-elasticity of participation without prior application of the disabled workers, L , reduces the participation tax T L T W . Intuitively, a larger percentage of disabled people who directly take low-skilled jobs without applying for disability bene…ts reduces the monitoring expenditures. Therefore, less tax revenue is needed which reduces the participation tax T L T W .
Conversely, a similar reasoning applies to explain why a lower quasi-elasticity of participation L raises the participation tax T L T W .
With costly monitoring (M
formula (22) emphasizes that the participation tax T L T W decreases with the per capita cost of monitoring M (p; q). In other words, the …nancial incentive to enter the labor force increases with the per capita cost of monitoring. Intuitively, monitoring costs make inactivity more expensive, hence …nancial incentives are needed to reduce inactivity.
, we also see that improving the redistribution toward a subset of the disabled, i.e. increasing the di¤erential between disability and welfare bene…ts
which is non-negative from (8)), reduces the participation tax (T L T W )
to keep stable the number of workers. In particular, a larger disability bene…t T D = x D reduces the tax in low-skilled job T L in order to keep stable the threshold value that characterizes disabled workers indi¤erent between a low-skilled job and applying for disability assistance, i.e. e d in (5).
First-order condition with respect to x H , (23) Considering a small change dx H > 0, adding the induced mechanical and behavioral e¤ects and putting this sum equal to zero would easily give:
From the Lagrangian (19), it is straightforward to check that this expression is the …rst-order condition with respect to x H . The interpretation of Equation (23) is similar to the above interpretation of (22) where p and subscript L are substituted by 1 q and H, respectively. The other di¤erence between both equations is a …rst best motive for taxation captured by the last term of the R.H.S. of (23), which can be rewritten as
we now explain. This expression is the result of the fact that the marginal disutilities e a and b a are not included in the paternalistic criterion. This term appears since an in…nitesimal change in the consumption bundle of able workers (dx H > 0) induces the N a qg e a e a pivotal able agents who are on disability assistance and the N a (1 q) g b a b a pivotal able agents who are on welfare to start working. This has a …rst-order e¤ect on paternalistic evaluation of their well-being equal to
which, by virtue of (6) and (7), reduces to e a and b a respectively so that we get the numerator of the above expression. The Lagrangian multiplier in the denominator converts this …rst-order e¤ect in terms of public funds. This term is sometimes called the paternalistic or …rst-best motive for taxation since it arises from di¤erences between social and private preferences (Kanbur et al., 2006) . It corrects the labor supply of able people to correspond more closely to social preferences. From (23), the larger this term, the lower the participation tax T H T W since it reinforces the labor supply of the able individuals which better complies with the paternalistic preferences.
Under utilitarian preferences, this …rst-best motive for taxation vanishes since there is no divergence between private and social preferences. Under utilitarian preferences, the participation tax on the able people is then very similar to the one on the disabled in Equation (22), see Appendix G.
First-order condition with respect to x D , (24) It is easy to check that Equation (24) is the …rst-order condition with respect to x D . Considering a small increase in consumption x D allows to heuristically derive the following expression
which is equivalent to (24). Since this exercise is basically similar to the one we made for (22), it is skipped here.
The …rst term in the R.H.S. of (24), (g D 1) = D , is the classic equity-e¢ ciency tradeo¤ . It emphasizes that the participation tax T L T D is inversely related to D , the participation elasticity of the recipients of disability bene…ts with respect to the bene…t x D .
The participation tax, T L T D , increases with the marginal social welfare weight of disability bene…ts'recipients g D . Intuitively, the larger this marginal social welfare weight, the more people on disability assistance are subsidized compared to disabled workers.
In the R.H.S. of Equation (24), the term which includes monitoring M (p; q) emphasizes that a larger cost of monitoring reduces the participation tax T L T D . Introducing endogenous monitoring amounts to reducing the welfare weight of recipients of disability bene…ts so that the tax in lowskilled jobs plus the disability bene…t shrinks. Intuitively, investing more public funds in monitoring expenditure (in order to reduce the tagging errors) reduces the amounts that can be redistributed toward people on disability assistance. Moreover,
at the denominator stands for all (able and disabled) recipients of disability bene…ts. Ceteris paribus, the monitoring term becomes less negative when this proportion of population gets larger.
Therefore, the participation tax increases. Intuitively, this is because more disabled recipients reduces the number of taxpayers and increases the total cost of monitoring. Therefore, more tax revenue is needed which increases the participation tax T L T D . In contrast, the participation tax decreases with the expression N d f e d + N a g e a at the numerator, ceteris paribus. The latter stands for all pivotal (able and disabled) recipients of disability bene…ts who apply for disability bene…ts while they would not apply and would work if x D were reduced by a small amount. The participation tax decreases with N d f e d + N a g e a to provide …nancial incentives to enter the labor force to those pivotal agents.
We skip the interpretations of the last two terms in the R.H.S. of Equation (24) since they are similar to the interpretations we have for the last term of (22) and the penultimate term of (23) and to the …rst-best motive for taxation term in (23).
A necessary condition on the marginal cost of public funds , (25)
The necessary condition (25) comes from equations (22), (23), (24) and the necessary condition with respect to x W that can be stated as
Dividing (28), (30), (31) and (32) 
, respectively, and adding these equations gives (25).
Equation (25) is similar to Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) 's equation (6) . Weighting this by the frequencies of these groups in the population, we …nd that we need an additional g A units of public revenue to …nance this operation (see (20)). In terms of social welfare, this is worth g A . This has to be equal to the increase in the social objective function caused by the uniform increase in utilities, which is equal to D. Remarkably, under paternalistic utilitarian preferences, D = 1 from (21). Equation (25) thus equates the inverse of the marginal cost of public funds to the ratio of the average of the inverse of the private utilities and the marginal social utility of a uniform increase in all individual utilities, the latter being equal to one under paternalism. Multiplying both sides of (25) by , this principle can be rephrased as: the average (using population proportions) value of the inverses of the marginal welfare weights is one.
First-order conditions with respect to p and q, (26) and (27) Equations (26) and (27) are the …rst-order conditions with respect to the levels of type I and type II errors, p and q, respectively.
The optimal level of type I errors (p) trades o¤ a reduction in monitoring costs and the extra tax revenue from disabled people who enter the labor force against the costs in terms of welfare (in particular, from disabled applicants who, falsely rejected from disability assistance, end up on welfare assistance). The inequality in (26) can be written as:
We interpret this equation heuristically as follows. Consider dp > 0, it implies the following mechanical and monitoring e¤ects on government revenue and welfare. There is a mechanical gain in monitoring expenditures equal to
because the per capita cost on the
=q people who are monitored is reduced (@M (p; q)=@p < 0). There is an e¤ect on government revenue and welfare due to the change in the accuracy of monitoring. There is a gain in tax revenue equal to
as a result of extra disabled recipients who work or receive welfare bene…ts x W rather than being on disability assistance. Moreover, dp > 0 also a¤ects the welfare due to the change of occupation of these disabled people. This gain in welfare can be written as
N d dp which can be rewritten as
from (5) and (3). In case of an interior solution for p, all of these e¤ects sum to zero. The inequality (33) is then binding.
The optimal level of type II errors (q) results from the optimal trade-o¤ between improving the accuracy of monitoring which brings more tax revenue from the new workers but which, at the same time, is costly. The inequality in (27) can be rewritten as:
In case of an interior solution for q, all of these e¤ects sum to zero. The inequality (34) is then binding.
A heuristic interpretation very similar to the one we just made for (26) is easy to make hence it is skipped here. The main di¤erence between (33) and (34) is the integral term
in the former inequality which has no equivalent term in the latter inequality. This is due to the d disutility terms of disabled workers which are valued by the Paternalistic objective function while the a disutility terms of able workers are not taken into account by the objective function.
In case of an interior solution for the probability of type I errors p < 1 (type II errors q < 1), the optimal amount of monitoring is such that the impact of a small increase in the probability of type I errors dp > 0 (type II errors dq > 0) cancels out the mechanical and behavioral e¤ects such that @$=@p = 0 (@$=@q = 0). When the marginal costs of monitoring j@M=@pj (j@M=@qj) is not huge, some positive cost of monitoring is always optimal because it reduces the number of type I and type II errors, thereby improving e¢ ciency. However, when j@M=@pj (j@M=@qj) is very high, p = 1 (q = 1) prevails at the optimum. No monitoring is optimal (i.e. M (p; q) = 0), as whoever applies for disability bene…ts is rejected (obtains them).
Optimality of an EITC among the disabled
From Proposition 2, we can now study whether an EITC-style work incentive scheme among the disabled can be optimal.
In the extensive margin model of Diamond (1980) and Saez (2002) where all inactive receive welfare bene…ts, Equation (29) points out that a negative (positive) participation tax T L T W , i.e. an EITC (an NIT) for workers who forgo welfare assistance, is optimal depending on g L 1 (g L < 1) (Saez, 2002) . Intuitively, when the social marginal welfare weight g L is relatively large on low-paid workers, they receive a work subsidy ( T L > 0) which is larger than the welfare bene…t ( T W ).
In our model with both welfare and disability bene…ts and monitoring costs, the following corollary emphasizes that g L 1 is a su¢ cient condition for an EITC for disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance, i.e. a negative participation tax T L T W < 0. Contrastingly, g L < 1 does not guarantee an NIT, i.e. a positive participation tax T L T W > 0, for these workers.
Corollary 1 An EITC (i.e. a negative participation tax) for disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance is optimal when g L 1. This EITC result can also carry through with g L < 1.
The proof is provided in Appendix D. Corollary 1 gives a su¢ cient condition for an EITC for disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance, i.e. T L T W < 0. Moreover, an EITC provides work incentives that, by reducing the number of applicants for disability bene…ts, reduce monitoring costs. Consequently, an EITC is optimal for a greater array of marginal social welfare weights g L than in the pure extensive margin model: An EITC can be optimal when g L < 1 when monitoring is introduced in the extensive margin model.
The next corollary shows that it can also be optimal to have an EITC for disabled workers who forgo disability assistance, i.e. T L T D < 0.
Corollary 2 An EITC for disabled workers who forgo disability assistance is optimal when g D < 1.
An EITC for disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance is also optimal when g D < 1.
Appendix E gives the proof. Assuming g D < 1 implies an EITC for disabled workers who forgo disability bene…ts, i.e. T L T D < 0 as well as an EITC for disabled workers who forgo welfare
and (18). We then have an example where an EITC for disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance coexists with g L < 1, as highlighted by Corollary 1.
At this stage of the analysis, it becomes obvious that Lemma 1, Proposition 2, Corollaries 1 and 2 may easily be extended to a more general utility function, but at the cost of more extensive notations and derivations without bringing further economic intuitions and results, so we prefer to stick to the simple quasilinear form.
Results with costless monitoring
Under full information, Section 3 has shown that enforcing all able agents to work is optimal under paternalistic utilitarian preferences. This is feasible because individual characteristics are perfectly observed. It may be interesting to study whether enforcing all able people to work is still optimal under asymmetric information when the monitoring perfectly screens between able and disabled applicants and, is costless. A perfect screening between able and disabled people who apply for disability bene…ts means there are no type I and type II errors (p = q = 0). The disability agency perfectly observes the disability status of applicants but not the disability status of people who do not apply. We assume that monitoring is costless hence M (p; q) = 0 whatever the values of p and q. Under asymmetric information, the next proposition points out that enforcing all able people to work while using p = q = 0 and costless monitoring of applicants is not optimal.
Proposition 3 With costless monitoring, no type I errors (i.e. p = 0), no type II errors (i.e. q = 0) and full employment of the able (i.e. b a ! 1) is not optimal under paternalistic utilitarian preferences.
Appendix F gives the proof. This result relies on the fact that individual levels of disutility of work d and a are not observable under asymmetric information. Monitoring improves information on the applicants because their productivity w Y (Y = L; H) is perfectly observed provided that p = q = 0. However, full revelation never occurs. To implement the …rst-best allocation, the tax authority would need to observe perfectly not only the health status of claimants but also the precise level. However, neither the tax authority nor the disability agencies observe the individual levels. Without this information, to have some disabled with d below some threshold who work, like it is the case in the …rst-best economy, the government needs to rely on …nancial incentives. Hence, x L > x D is the only way to guarantee that some disabled agents work in the second-best. Financial incentives for able agents are also required to avoid that they all only work in low-skilled jobs. The lowest …nancial incentive such that they all work in high-skilled jobs is
(as also emphasized in the proof in Appendix F). This has a too large welfare cost for the disabled recipients that makes this con…guration not optimal.
We believe that this result may be of some use for policy recommendations. In Norway for instance, several economists and politicians have recently proposed strengthening controls in disability programs to eliminate those able people who abuse the system. In the current budgetary, demographic, and economic contexts, to cut unnecessary costs may be a good idea. However, a government that, roughly speaking, wants to help the disabled but not lazy able persons should allow some cheating, according to Proposition 3. This occurs because to reach the ideal …rst-best optimum requires not only perfect information on the health status of claimants (able versus disabled) but also their precise disutility of work given their handicap. Since this is not feasible, having no classi…cation errors and all able people who work would be welfare-reducing.
Conclusion
This paper assumed an economy where individuals choose whether they participate to the labor market. If they do not participate, they receive welfare bene…ts or, after monitoring of their disability status, they may obtain disability bene…ts. Type I errors, type II errors and non takeup co-exist in disability assistance. An endogenous and costly monitoring allows restricting the number of type I and type II errors.
The optimal redistributive schedule that encapsulates nonlinear taxation, welfare bene…ts and disability bene…ts has been derived under paternalistic utilitarian and utilitarian preferences. Our main outcomes can be summarized as follows.
We have shown that the participation tax on workers who forgo welfare assistance is inversely related to the participation elasticity and decreases with the marginal social welfare weight of disabled workers, as in the model without disability bene…ts nor monitoring. We have also found that this participation tax decreases with the (per capita) monitoring cost. Intuitively, monitoring costs make inactivity more expensive, hence …nancial incentives are used to reduce inactivity. Moreover, this participation tax is decreasing with the percentage of disabled people who enter the labor force without having applied for disability assistance. Intuitively, the larger this percentage, the lower the monitoring expenditure hence less tax revenue is needed which reduces the participation tax.
We have shown that a social marginal welfare weight on disabled workers lower than one does not guarantee a Negative Income Tax as it would in a model without monitoring nor disability bene…ts (see Diamond (1980) and Saez (2002) ). An Earned Income Tax Credit can then prevail.
Intuitively, an Earned Income Tax Credit provides strong work incentives that, by reducing the number of applicants for disability bene…ts, reduce monitoring costs. Consequently, an Earned Income Tax Credit is optimal for a greater array of model parameters than in the model without neither monitoring nor disability assistance.
The model sheds light on the optimal levels of type I and type II errors. The optimal level of type I error is determined by the trade-o¤ between a gain in tax revenue on the one hand and a loss in welfare on the other. The gain in tax revenue stems from an increase in the number of type I errors (because monitoring cost is reduced and because some disabled people enter the labor force). The welfare loss comes from disabled people who are wrongly rejected from disability assistance. The optimal level of type II errors is determined by the trade-o¤ between a gain and a loss in tax revenue. Reducing the number of cheaters is costly in monitoring but avoids giving disability bene…ts to undeserving people.
Finally, we have shown that a costless monitoring technology that would perfectly screen between disabled and able applicants and would enforce all able to work is not optimal. Intuitively, the tax authority would observe the correct health status of claimants by its monitoring but not their precise disutility if they worked. Therefore, the ideal full information allocation could not be reached.
Appendices

A Proof of Proposition 1
where P is the paternalistic utilitarian criterion (provided in Equation (1)) and is the (nonnegative) Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint.
For any pair ( d ; a ), the …rst-order conditions with respect to the four consumption functions can be written as:`L
Since`X ( y ) ((X; y) = (L; d) ; (H; a)) is equal to 1 or 0, only two of these …rst-order conditions matter. For those that matter, the corresponding social marginal utilities of consumption have to be equal. For the other two, the consumption function does not matter (as nobody with this value for y is receiving it). Therefore, since is a constant, we have that the …rst-order conditions with respect to consumption reduce to 8 ( d ; a ):
From (35), the tax/transfer toward the disabled workers, x w L , is lower than the transfer to the inactive disabled, x. An NIT is optimal. From the budget constraint, we have
x only depends on the number of disabled and the number of able agents who are employed.
Consequently, the value of our objective function becomes
The value of our objective function is maximal when all able agents work:`H ( a ) = 1 8 a . Therefore, from the budget constraint, we have 
with (y; Y ) = (d; L). Since v 0 (x) and w L are …nite, d < 1. It implies that it is optimal for some disabled individuals not to work.
B Proof of Equation (2)
By contrast, suppose x H < x L . All able individuals who work choose to produce w L units and receive net income x L . From (6) and (7) where max fx L ; x H g replaces x H , nobody gets x H as a consumption bundle. Then, keeping x L …xed, we can assume dx H > 0 such that
Now, able people who work produce w H units and get x H as a consumption bundle. Increasing the level of x H up to x L does not require any additional consumption since x H + dx H x L = 0 and since e a , b a and the number of able people who work is unchanged. The number of able people who are on disability assistance and on welfare assistance are then also unchanged. Hence, from (6) and (7), e d , b d and the number of disabled people on disability assistance and on welfare assistance do not change as well. Yet, all able workers now choose high-skilled jobs and earn w H (> w L ). Since the cost in terms of supplementary consumption is zero and the di¤erence w H w L is strictly positive, a net receipt appears: w H w L > 0. The …scal pie increases and more redistribution can occur. This will indubitably increase welfare. Therefore, it cannot be optimal for the government to let x L > x H and, thus, consumption when producing more units must be larger:
C Proof of Lemma 1
(1) Both e a and e d are smaller than 1. As
people work means e a ! 1 ( e d ! 1) at the optimum. Since consumption levels are …nite, from (6) and (5), e a and e d cannot tend to 1.
(2) If no one works, i.e., e a = e d = 0, it is optimal for everyone to have the same consumption:
Rg. This allocation will not be optimal if those with the least were to choose to work for the additional consumption equal to their marginal product. It will be the case since
at the optimum. More generally, for all planners with an objective function that is increasing in individual utilities, making some disabled and able people work is optimal.
D Proof of Corollary 1
From (22), g L 1 , T L T W 0 since (i) the second term in the R.H.S of (22) is nonpositive because M (p; q) 0 and (ii) the third term in the R.H.S of (22) is non-positive because
Therefore, an EITC for disabled workers who leave welfare is optimal. This result prevails with M (p; q) 0. Moreover, g L < 1 does not imply T L > T W (i.e., an NIT for disabled workers who forgo welfare) as long as monitoring is costly (i.e. M (p; q) > 0) or a disability system prevails (i.e. x D > x W ). This is because the …rst term in the R.H.S. of (22) is positive but the two other terms are negative. Both an NIT and an EITC may prevail when g L < 1.
E Proof of Corollary 2
Assume g D < 1, the …rst term of the L.H.S. of (31) Moreover, we know that T D T W (> 0) from (8). Therefore, T L T D < 0 implies T L T W < 0. That is, disabled workers who forgo welfare assistance also face an EITC.
F Proof of Proposition 3
For contrast, we assume p = 0, q = 0 and b a 7 ! 1. All disabled who apply for disability bene…ts get them, i.e. p = 0. None of them receive the welfare bene…t x W . All able people are rejected from disability assistance, i.e. q = 0. From (7), b a 7 ! 1 means that v (x W ) 7 ! 1 i.e. x W = 0 with lim x7 !0 v (x) 7 ! 1. We then have a H = N a (and the ICC on the able agents (6) and (7) are neglected). The …rst-order condition with respect to x H (30) becomes:
Therefore, v 0 (x H ) = . This implies that (25) (which is still valid with costless monitoring) becomes:
Since a weighted average with positive weights is bounded by its least and greatest elements, and since x L > x D (from (8)):
with at least a strict inequality. From the …rst inequality: x L x H . However x L > x H does not prevail at the optimum (otherwise all able recognized as cheaters would work in low-skilled jobs, which is ine¢ cient) hence x L = x H .
Substitute the latter into (38) gives
. This contradicts x L > x D . Therefore p = q = 0 and b a 7 ! 1 is not optimal.
G Results under utilitarian preferences
This appendix emphasizes that most of the results we have derived under paternalistic utilitarian preferences are still valid under utilitarianism. Utilitarian preferences consist in replacing the …rst term of the second line,`H ( a ) v (x w H ( a )), of the paternalistic utilitarian preferences (1) bỳ H ( a ) (v (x w H ( a )) a ). Under utilitarian preference, in full information, it is easy to see that the same …rst-order conditions as under paternalistic utilitarianism P are obtained, and so the solution is given by (35). 
and (31) becomes
Dividing these two equations by v 0 (x L ) and v 0 (x D ), respectively, and adding them gives
Substituting = v 0 (x H ) into the latter gives (38).
From the budget constraint, we then have (36). Substituting (36) in the utilitarian preferences gives the value of utilitarian welfare as a function of the`L ( d ) and`H ( a ) functions:
Keeping the number of employed of both types …xed, it is only through the terms on the last line that the shape of the`L ( d ) and`H ( a ) functions matter under utilitarianism. Hence, as k (k = d; a) rises from 0 to 1, the function`K ( k ) k ((K; k) = (L; d) ; (H; a)), where`K ( k ) = 1 8 k , goes from 0 to 1. Then it is always optimal to have those in work with the lowest k (k = d; a). In the second-best, because of the ICC, the utilitarian preferences become Under utilitarian preferences, Proposition 2 is valid except that the …rst-best motives for taxation are equal to zero. Since the proof is identical to the ones in Proposition 2, it is skipped here. There is no more change in welfare (directly) due to the behavioral response of the pivotal able workers leaving the labor force, characterized by a = e a and a = b a . Their well-being weight is now the same, in the social preferences, whether they are recipients or workers. Therefore, the paternalistic terms 
